Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 35

Issue 2

Article 6

2-1-2015

Playing Hide and Seek with Big Brother: Law Enforcement's Use of
Historical and Real Time Mobile Device Data
Ryan Merkel

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Ryan Merkel, Comment, Playing Hide and Seek with Big Brother: Law Enforcement’s Use of Historical and
Real Time Mobile Device Data, 35 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 429 (2015).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Playing Hide and Seek with Big Brother: Law
Enforcement’s Use of Historical and Real
Time Mobile Device Data
RYAN MERKEL*
Cell phones and smartphones are everywhere. Today the majority of
Americans own one of these mobile devices. Because these devices are only
useful when within arm’s reach, they are almost always in the same location as their owner. Even when not in use, these devices are in contact with
the towers which allow them to function. Via this contact, the device’s location, and as a byproduct the owner’s location, is recorded by the service
provider. In addition, smartphones are equipped with GPS technology
which allows for precise real-time and historical tracking of the device.
Law enforcement agencies across the country are obtaining this mobile
device location data from providers to aid them in a variety of investigations. This data has proven to be an invaluable resource to law enforcement. Currently federal law enforcement agencies can obtain this data
without first seeking a warrant based upon probable cause. Section 2703 of
the Stored Communications Act allows law enforcement to obtain this data
pursuant to a court order upon establishing that there are “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” This is a lesser standard than probable cause. This Comment
argues that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment law enforcement should be
required to obtain a warrant based upon probable cause prior to receiving
this data from service providers. This data can reveal sensitive and intimate
details about an individual’s activities and whereabouts otherwise unknowable. It is the position of this Comment that these details should be afforded
the minimal protection of a probable cause showing before they are disclosed. To be clear, this Comment recognizes the invaluable resource of
mobile data as a crime fighting tool and in no way suggests that law enforcement should be barred from using this data. Rather, law enforcement
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
One Mississippi, two Mississippi, three Mississippi, four Mississippi,
five Mississippi, six Mississippi, seven Mississippi. If you are the owner of
a cell phone or smartphone and your phone is currently turned on, in the
seven seconds it took you to read the first sentence of this Comment, your
phone’s location was recorded by your service provider.1 Odds are that your
cell phone or smartphone is in the same place as you, and if so, your location was recorded as a by-product and will be again in seven seconds as
long as the phone is turned on whether or not you have been using it.2 This
may very well come as a surprise, but it is no surprise to municipal, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies across the nation who are obtaining
this information from service providers to aid in criminal investigations.3

1.
See New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 636 (N.J. 2013) (citing In re Pen Register
& Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex.
2005).
2.
Id.
3.
See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records
Request (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cellphone-location-tracking-public-records-request [hereinafter Cell Phone Location Tracking].
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This Comment will explore the constitutionality of federal law enforcement agencies obtaining historical cell-site data and real time site data
from service providers. In order to discuss the constitutionality of law enforcement using this data, it is necessary to have a basic background understanding of what this data is and how it is gathered. The first few pages of
this Comment are designated for that purpose. This Comment will then
examine historical Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the protections
afforded to civilians by the Fourth Amendment. Further, this Comment will
discuss three recent cases that have reached differing conclusions as to the
constitutional burdens placed on law enforcement before it can obtain location information from service providers.4 Specifically, this Comment will
argue that the Fourth Amendment and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the Fourth Amendment mandate that federal law enforcement agencies wishing to obtain location data from service providers
first obtain a warrant based upon probable cause, except in exigent circumstances. This argument is based on the premise that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location data given off from their mobile devices, that individuals do not knowingly expose their location data to
the public by simply possessing a mobile device, that location data reveals
intimate details about the home otherwise unknowable to law enforcement
and that jurisprudence affording less Fourth Amendment protection to business records is outdated and incompatible with modern technology.

II. BACKGROUND
Like it or not, it is an unavoidable fact of American life that cell
phones and smartphones are everywhere. According to the Pew Research
Center, as of May 2013, ninety-one percent of American adults own a cell
phone and fifty-six percent own a smartphone.5 Further, the number of cell
phone owners has been on the rise, growing from sixty-five percent of
Americans in November 2004, to ninety-one percent in May 2013.6 As a
result of the increased popularity of cell and smartphones, the number of
cell towers in the United States has grown from 104,288 in 2000 to 301,779
in 2012.7

4.
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); Earls, 70 A.3d 630.
5.
Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6,
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-ofadults/.
6.
Id.
7.
Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
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Cell phones and smartphones (hereinafter “mobile devices”) can be
tracked using two primary methods.8 The two methods are network based
(hereinafter “cell-site”) tracking and handset based (Global Positioning
System, hereinafter “GPS”) tracking.9 Network based tracking was alluded
to in the introduction of this Comment with reference to a mobile device’s
location being recorded by a service provider every seven seconds. Network based tracking occurs automatically as a mobile device communicates
with the network via radio waves between the device and cell-sites or radio
bases.10 Cell-sites are essentially the large radio towers which are commonplace on the sides of roadways, but as modern technology has advanced,
these cell-sites can be much more discreet.11 Mobile devices communicate
with the cell-site that is nearest to the device because it provides the strongest signal.12 This automatic and continuous communication between mobile
devices and cell-sites is necessary to ensure that incoming calls can be routed to the mobile device.13
Each time a mobile device communicates with the nearest cell-site, the
location of the mobile device is subsequently stored in a database maintained by the specific service provider.14 The amount of time a service provider will retain this location data gained from individual cell-sites depends
on the service provider.15 According to data compiled by the United States
Department of Justice, the retention times can be substantial, ranging from
one rolling year in the case of Verizon Wireless, to indefinitely for communications with cell-sites from AT&T customers subsequent to 2008.16
The accuracy of the location information that network based tracking
provides depends on how closely cell-sites are located to one another.17 The
area serviced by an individual cell-site is known as a sector and the closer
cell-sites are spaced, the smaller an individual sector will be.18 As mentioned above, the number of cell-sites has nearly tripled over the last dec8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 636.
11.
See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Prof. Matt Blaze), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/111th/111109_57082.PDF.
12.
Id. at 20.
13.
Id. at 13.
14.
Id. at 27.
15.
Id. at 16.
16.
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response –
Cell Phone Company Data Retention Chart (Aug. 2010), https://www.aclu.org/cell-phonelocation-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart.
17.
See Hearing, supra note 11, at 23-24.
18.
Id. at 24-25.
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ade, resulting in greater accuracy in network based tracking.19 The size of a
sector largely depends on the population density of a specific area.20 According to Professor Matt Blaze of the University of Pennsylvania:
[T]he largest sectors can still be several miles in
diameter in rural areas, sparsely populated areas.
But the latest technology has trended toward what
are called variously microcells, picocells and
femtocells that are designed not to serve an area of
miles in diameter, but rather to serve a very, very
specific location, such as a floor of a building or
even an individual room in a building such as a
train station waiting room or an office complex or
hotel or even a private home.21
Federal regulations now require a baseline of accuracy that service
providers must meet in regards to locating mobile devices. Regulations by
the Federal Communications Commission required cell phone carriers to
have, by 2012, the ability to locate phones within one hundred meters for
sixty-seven percent of calls and three hundred meters for ninety-five percent of calls for network based calls.22 They must also be able to locate
phones within fifty meters for sixty-seven percent of calls and one hundred
and fifty meters for ninety-five percent of calls for handset based calls.23
It is clear that mobile devices are becoming more prevalent, while at
the same time, the sectors used by the devices are shrinking. It is a fair assumption that this trend will continue in the future. As a result, the location
information provided by network based tracking will also likely improve in
accuracy as time progresses.
The second primary means to track a phone is handset based, which
relies on GPS to locate the mobile device.24 The majority of cell phones
today contain GPS receivers.25 Further, many mobile devices contain GPS
chips that can be used for emergency tracking.26 For example, since December 31, 2003, all new handsets sold by Verizon Wireless (which happens to be one of America’s largest service providers) contain such chips to
19.
New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. 2013).
20.
Hearing, supra note 11, at 14-15.
21.
Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
22.
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 47
C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2012)).
23.
Id.
24.
Earls, 70 A.3d at 636.
25.
Id. at 637 (citing Jagdish Rebello, Four Out of Five Cell Phones to Integrate
GPS by End of 2011, IHS TECH. (July 16, 2010), https://technology.ihs.com/388892/).
26.
Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
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help locate a phone in the case of an emergency.27 Utilizing these GPS receivers, mobile devices so equipped, calculate their location on their own
by communicating with satellites in orbit.28 This technology works reliably
outdoors and can locate a phone “to within about 10 meters of accuracy.”29

III. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States protects the people of the
United States from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”30 Specifically, the
Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.31
Of special importance for purposes of this Comment is the constitutional requirement that before a warrant can be issued probable cause must
be established.32
The second statutory provision of central importance to this Comment
is Section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (hereinafter “SCA”).33
This statute provides in part:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or
(c) may be issued by any court that is a court of
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the
governmental entity offers specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not is27.
Id. (citing VERIZON WIRELESS, Wireless Issues: Enhanced 911 (2014),
http://aboutus.verizonwireless.com/commitment/safety_security/).
28.
See Hearing, supra note 11, at 20-21.
29.
Id. at 14, 22.
30.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31.
Id. (emphasis added).
32.
See id.
33.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
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sue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court
issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may
quash or modify such order, if the information or
records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise
would cause an undue burden on such provider.34
For purposes of this Comment it is critical to point out at this juncture
the differences between the Fourth Amendment requirements and those in
the SCA. The Fourth Amendment concerns warrants relating to a search or
seizure by government officials, while Section 2703 of the SCA concerns
court orders allowing government officials to obtain information from service providers.35 Further, the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of
probable cause before a warrant will be issued, while the SCA requires a
showing of “specific and articulable facts” by the government before a
court order will be issued requiring a service provider to turn over customer
information to the police.36

IV. HISTORICAL FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS
In 1967, the Supreme Court released a decision that spawned a line of
precedent interpreting Fourth Amendment protections. Katz v. United
States, involved FBI agents attaching a listening and recording device to the
outside of a phone booth in order to listen in on Katz’s phone calls while
Katz was involved in taking illegal bets.37 The Court determined that the
FBI’s use of the recording device without first obtaining a warrant based on
probable cause violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.38 Of most significance to the issue at hand in this
Comment is the rule that the Court has adopted, which was first expressed
in the concurring opinion of Justice John M. Harlan II.39 The test is twofold
and reads:
[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus a man's home is, for
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 361.
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most purposes, a place where he expects privacy,
but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected”
because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited.40
Also significant to the discussion of this Comment is the Court’s determination that what a person “knowingly exposes to the public” is afforded less protection under the Fourth Amendment.41 Specifically, the Court
stated:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.42
In 1983, the Supreme Court applied the Katz43 test in United States v.
Knotts where law enforcement caused an electronic monitoring device
placed in a container of chemicals to come into the possession of the defendant without first obtaining a warrant.44 Law enforcement used this device to aid in their surveillance of the defendant but only in areas where the
defendant could have been watched by ordinary means, such as, public
roadways.45 The Court determined that the use of the electronic device did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.46 The Court reasoned that the
defendant did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when traveling from one place to another because in doing so he had conveyed that
information to anyone who was looking.47
Just one year later, the Court addressed a similar case involving the
use of a concealed electronic monitoring device without a warrant by law
enforcement in United States v. Karo. In Karo, the Court reached a conclusion contrary to United States v. Knotts regarding whether a Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred.48 The distinction between Karo and
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 351.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
Id. at 347.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278-79 (1983).
See id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 281.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984).
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Knotts turned on the fact that in Karo the device entered the defendant’s
home and in doing so revealed sensitive information that could not have
otherwise been observed.49 Further, unlike Knotts the Court in Karo determined that the defendant had not “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look” by bringing the device into his house.50 The Court summarized saying, “[i]n sum, we discern no reason for deviating from the general
rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.”51
Karo does not stand alone in its expression that an individual’s home
is afforded the highest levels of Fourth Amendment protection.52 The Court
has stated “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first
among equals.”53 “At the Amendment's ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”54 Further, the Court has opined that “[i]n the home,
our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is
held safe from prying government eyes.”55
The Supreme Court has expanded upon Katz to further define when an
individual has “knowingly expose[d]” something to the public therefore
waiving his Fourth Amendment guarantee that said information would not
be known by the government absent a warrant.56 One such example is United States v. Miller, where the Court determined that individuals do not have
a reasonable expectation in bank records relating to an account of theirs.57
The Court explained that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government.”58 Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court found that
when a telephone company installs a device to record the numbers dialed by
an individual in response to a police request that no Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred.59 The Court determined that the “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”60 “In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would

49.
Id.
50.
Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
51.
Id. at 718.
52.
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
53.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
54.
Id. (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511).
55.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
56.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
57.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
58.
Id. at 443.
59.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
60.
Id.
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reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”61 Justice Thurgood Marshall was of
the opposite opinion, writing “[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or
phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this
information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”62
While Miller and Smith certainly represent that an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” shrinks when they expose information to
third parties,63 the Supreme Court in other circumstances has held that
while a third party may be allowed to view an individual’s private information in the course of business, it does not give them free reign to turn that
information over to law enforcement.64 For example, the Supreme Court
has determined that when a landlord had authority to enter the house of a
tenant renter under certain circumstances that authority did not permit the
landlord to give police permission to search the rented house absent a warrant.65 Doing so in the Court’s opinion would reduce the Fourth Amendment privacy in one’s home to the discretion of a landlord.66 Similarly, the
Court has determined that while the janitorial staff at a hotel does have the
authority to enter a rented hotel room, that authority does not allow them to
grant access to law enforcement that do not have a search warrant.67

V. RECENT CASES ON POINT
A.

UNITED STATES V. JONES

The question of the constitutionality of electronic surveillance of persons by law enforcement is by no means a new controversy as evidenced by
Olmstead v. United States,68 a prohibition era phone tapping case, which
was overturned by Katz v. United States.69 In 2012, the Supreme Court was
called upon to resolve a conflict between the use of GPS trackers by law
enforcement and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches in United States v. Jones.70 In Jones, law enforcement officers
installed a GPS tracking device on the vehicle which was operated by the
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 749 (citing Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95-96 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
63.
See Miller, 425 U.S. at 435; Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
64.
See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964).
65.
See Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616-17.
66.
Id.
67.
Stoner, 376 U.S. at 487-88.
68.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
69.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
70.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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defendant after he became the target of a narcotics trafficking investigation.71 The officers had obtained a warrant to install the device, but when
the device was installed it was done outside the temporal and geographic
scope of the warrant.72 The government used the information from this GPS
device to track the vehicle for twenty-eight days.73 After being indicted for
several narcotics related offenses, Jones sought to have the evidence gained
by the government’s use of the GPS tracker suppressed as a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.74
The issue reached the Supreme Court and Justice Antonin Scalia issued the plurality opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Sonia
Sotomayor joined, concluding the government’s installment of the GPS
tracker outside the scope of the warrant constituted a Fourth Amendment
violation.75 Justice Sotomayor also authored a separate opinion concurring
in the judgment, as did Justice Samuel Alito who was joined by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Justice Stephen Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagen.76 In
sum, all nine Justices agreed that the government’s installment of the GPS
tracking device on Jones’ vehicle was outside the limits of the warrant and
therefore constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.77 But, the three opinions were based on differing rationales as to how that conclusion was
reached.78
Justice Scalia concluded that it was not necessary to apply the Katz79
analysis because Justice Scalia determined the instillation of the beeper to
be a “trespassory search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment.80 Further,
Justice Scalia opined that Katz analysis is not the exclusive manner for the
Court to address possible Fourth Amendment violations.81 Of specific importance for purposes of this Comment is Justice Scalia’s opinion that
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”82
While Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s opinion, she wrote
separately expressing that while the use of the GPS tracker violated Jones’s
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz, Justice Scalia’s approach
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947-54 (2012).
Id. at 954-64.
See id. at 945.
Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
Id. at 953.
Id.
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provided a narrower basis for the decision.83 In doing so, Justice Sotomayor
wrote, “[m]ore fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”84 in reference to the Court’s
decisions in Miller85 and Smith.86 Further, Justice Sotomayor opined:
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the
phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the email addresses with which they correspond to their
Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers . . . I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public
for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.87
Justice Alito’s concurrence concludes that the long-term GPS tracking
of Jones’ vehicle impinged on his reasonable expectation to privacy under
Katz88 and was therefore a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.89
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Alito commented, in regards to reasonable expectations to privacy under Katz,90 that “[d]ramatic technological
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”91 Further,
Justice Alito recognized that the traceable nature of mobile devices may be
the most significant technological change effecting reasonable expectations
of privacy.92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 957.
Id.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
Katz, 398 U.S. 347.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962.
Id. at 963.
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UNITED STATES V. SKINNER

While United States v. Jones93 did not directly focus on the constitutionality of law enforcement obtaining location data from mobile devices
absent a warrant, a few federal appellate courts have had to address the issue head-on, while many others have yet to do so.94 One such jurisdiction
that ruled on the issue was the Sixth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in
United States v. Skinner.95 In Skinner, Federal Drug Enforcement Agency
(hereinafter “DEA”) agents tracked the defendant’s movements in real time
along public highways between Arizona and Tennessee using GPS “ping
data” obtained via court order from the defendant’s pay-as-you-go service
provider.96 Ping data is gathered by calling an individual’s mobile device
and then hanging up before it rings in order to reveal the phones physical
location via GPS.97 Based on this location data, DEA agents were able to
locate the defendant and his son at a Texas rest stop and seize 1,100 pounds
of marijuana.98 The court in Skinner held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when DEA agents obtained and used the location data given
off by the defendant’s mobile device.99 The court stated that the defendant
“did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given off by
his voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone.”100 This language is
clearly alluding to the second prong of the Katz101 analysis, yet the majority
in Skinner never directly references Katz.102 The court in Skinner found the
facts of Skinner to be directly comparable to those in Knotts,103 where the
Supreme Court found no constitutional violation because location information revealed by electronic surveillance along public roadways could
have been obtained by visual observation.104 Further, the Skinner court distinguished the case from Jones on the basis that there was no governmental
trespass in Skinner,105 which was the basis of Justice Scalia’s opinion,106 nor
was the tracking so extensive in time to violate a reasonable expectation of
93.
Id. at 948.
94.
E.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
95.
Skinner, 690 F.3d 772.
96.
Id. at 774-76.
97.
Id. at 778.
98.
Id. at 774.
99.
Id. at 777.
100.
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012).
101.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
102.
Id.
103.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
104.
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778.
105.
Id. at 779-80.
106.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
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privacy107 discussed by Justice Alito in Jones.108 Additionally, the Skinner
court determined, based on Karo,109 that Skinner accepted his mobile device with the GPS technology inside and therefore could not complain
when that technology subsequently revealed his location on public thoroughfares.110
C.

IN RE U.S. FOR HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA

A year after Skinner111 was decided, the Fifth Circuit in In re U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data was called upon to decide the constitutionality of
law enforcement obtaining location data from a service provider based on a
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) court order.112 The United States government in In re
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data submitted three applications to a federal
magistrate judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) seeking evidence relevant
to three separate criminal investigations from mobile device service providers.113 The government sought the same type of evidence in each application.114 Specifically, the government wanted sixty days of historical cell-site
data relating to three mobile devices based on network based tracking
which relies upon a mobile device communicating with a cell-site such as a
cell tower as discussed previously in this Comment.115 The magistrate judge
denied the applications despite the government having demonstrated the
“specific and articulable facts” required by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), on the
grounds that “[c]ompelled warrantless disclosures of cell site data violate[]
the Fourth Amendment.”116 The government challenged the magistrate
judge’s ruling in the federal district court and lost.117 The district court
judge determined that such disclosure of cell-site data may only be acquired
by a warrant issued on probable cause and that the “specific and articulable
facts” standard under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) is below the standard required by
the United States Constitution.118
107.
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780.
108.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
109.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
110.
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780-81.
111.
Id. at 772.
112.
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
113.
Id. at 602 (a showing of probable cause is not required by 18 U.S.C § 2703(d)
(2012)).
114.
Id.
115.
Id.; see also Hearing, supra note 11, at 12-30.
116.
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 602 (alteration in original)
(quoting In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
117.
Id. at 602-03.
118.
Id. at 602.
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The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination and
reached the opposite conclusion.119 In doing so, the court rejected the
American Civil Liberties Union’s (hereinafter “ACLU”) amici argument
that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location
information when they are tracked based on cell-site data.120 The court distinguished the facts of the case before them from those in Karo121 and
Smith122 on the basis that in those cases the government was the one responsible for the collection and recording of an individual’s information.123 Further, the court determined that “the [g]overnment does not require service
providers to record this information or store it.”124 The court determined
that the historical cell-site data obtained from service providers is “clearly a
business record.”125 This determination that cell-site data is a business record is critical to the court’s ultimate determination that the government
need not obtain a warrant before requiring service providers to turn over
cell-site data.126 The court cited Supreme Court precedent relating to exposures of information to third parties stating, “It is established that, when a
person communicates information to a third party even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third
party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities.”127 In sum, the court concluded that:
Because a cell phone user makes a choice to get a
phone, to select a particular service provider, and
to make a call, and because he knows that the call
conveys cell site information, the provider retains
this information, and the provider will turn it over
to the police if they have a court order, he voluntarily conveys his cell site data each time he makes a
call.128
In the court’s opinion, because individuals who own mobile devices
voluntarily convey this cell-site data to their service providers, who in turn
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 608.
121.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
122.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
123.
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 609.
124.
Id. at 612.
125.
Id. at 611.
126.
Id. at 610.
127.
Id. (quoting SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
128.
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013).

444

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

create business records from this information, there is no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement obtains this information absent a
warrant based on probable cause.129
D.

NEW JERSEY V. EARLS

While the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have determined that law enforcement compelling service providers to turn over location data derived from
mobile devices does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that such practice is a violation of the New Jersey Constitution.130 It is important to note that the decision in New Jersey v.
Earls was based on an interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution rather
than on an interpretation of the United States Constitution.131 Nonetheless,
this decision is a valuable resource when discussing the constitutionality of
location data being obtained via court order because the court in New Jersey
v. Earls engaged in much of the same analysis as the courts in Skinner132
and In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,133 yet it reached the opposite
conclusion.
In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed the idea that location
data is voluntarily conveyed to a third party service provider by the individual who owns a mobile device and therefore does not necessitate warrant
protection.134 In doing so, the court recognized the Supreme Court precedent in Smith135 and Miller136 underlying this rational but distinguished this
precedent in relation to the present issue of location data.137 The court
opined that “cell-phone users have no choice but to reveal certain information to their cellular provider. That is not a voluntary disclosure in a typical sense; it can only be avoided at the price of not using a cell phone.”138
Further, the court noted that location data reveals much more information to
service providers than in other third party situations.139 Specifically, the
court stated in regards to law enforcement tracking a mobile device that
“[i]t is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a substitute for
24/7 surveillance without police having to confront the limits of their resources. It also involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id. at 615.
New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013).
Id.
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600.
See Earls, 70 A.3d at 641.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Earls, 70 A.3d at 641.
Id.
Id. at 642.
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would not anticipate.”140 Moreover, the court stated that “details about the
location of a cell phone can provide an intimate picture of one’s daily
life.”141 The court then proceeded to examine what reasonable expectations
of privacy individuals have in their mobile devices location data.142 The
court took into account the increased accuracy and frequency of the information recorded by network based tracking commenting, “[C]ell phones
can be pinpointed with great precision—to within feet in some instances.
That information is updated every seven seconds through interactions with
cell towers, whether the phone is in public or private space.”143 Based on
this understanding of network based tracking the court reasoned that:
[C]ell phones are not meant to serve as tracking
devices to locate their owners wherever they may
be. People buy cell phones to communicate with
others, to use the Internet, and for a growing number of other reasons. But no one buys a cell phone
to share detailed information about their whereabouts with the police. That was true in 2006 and is
equally true today. Citizens have a legitimate privacy interest in such information. Although individuals may be generally aware that their phones
can be tracked, most people do not realize the extent of modern tracking capabilities and reasonably
do not expect law enforcement to convert their
phones into precise, possibly continuous tracking
tools.144
The court concluded that due to this reasonable expectation of privacy
in an individual’s location data, the New Jersey Constitution requires that
law enforcement must obtain a warrant before compelling service providers
to turn over that information.145

VI. ANALYSIS
A cursory comparison of the text of the Fourth Amendment with that
of section 2703(d) of the SCA reveals one glaring discrepancy.146 The dis140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Earls, 70 A.3d at 643.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).

446

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

crepancy is that while the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on
probable cause before law enforcement can search or seize “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”147 section 2703(d) of the SCA allows law enforcement to obtain location data from service providers via court order based on
a showing of “specific and articulable facts.”148 This discrepancy is not de
minimis because the standard law enforcement must meet under the SCA is
lower than that required by the Fourth Amendment.149 It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional law that while federal statutes and state statutes
may afford greater protections than those contained in the Constitution,
they cannot conflict with constitutional protections.150 The fact that the discrepancy exists between the Fourth Amendment and the SCA is not in and
of itself determinative that law enforcement obtaining location data without
a warrant is barred by the Fourth Amendment, but, when taken in light of
Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the Fourth Amendment such a
practice cannot be reconciled with the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.151 As a result, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have erred in determining that a warrant based on probable cause is not required before law
enforcement can obtain location data.152
A.

LOCATION DATA AND KATZ TWO PRONG TEST

A proper examination of location data in relation to the Fourth
Amendment is not possible without applying the two prong rule for determining when Fourth Amendment protections will apply,153 which was first
spelled out by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United
States,154 and subsequently adopted by the Court in numerous later opinions.155 According to the Katz test, law enforcement must obtain a warrant
147.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
148.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
149.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
150.
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
151.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
152.
See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that law enforcement obtaining location data from service providers without a
warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th
Cir. 2012).
153.
See New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 638 (N.J. 2013); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (stating “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”).
154.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
155.
See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27; Karo, 468 U.S. 705; Knotts,
460 U.S. 276.
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to gather information via a search if an individual has first “exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”156
Because the first prong of the test is viewed subjectively from the
viewpoint of the individual whose person or effects have been searched,
this part of the test will be met as long as an individual has taken steps to
preserve the privacy of the location of their mobile device and consequently
himself.157 This is due to the simple fact that a defendant who wishes to use
the Fourth Amendment as a means of excluding evidence is sure to argue
that they expected their mobile device’s location to remain private from the
eyes of law enforcement. The first prong of the test is a relatively low hurdle for a defendant to clear; as a result, the meat of the test is centered on
the second prong.158 So for the issue at hand, the question becomes is society prepared to recognize that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the location data transmitted by their mobile device to their service provider? Answering this type of question poses several types of difficulties, such as judges confusing their own expectations of privacy for those
of society and the reality that rapid technological advancements may alter
society’s reasonable expectations of privacy.159
Given these difficulties individuals who own a mobile device nonetheless should be viewed to hold an expectation of privacy in their location
data that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.160 As discussed in
the background section of this Comment, the vast majority of Americans
now own a mobile device,161 and the precision at which their location can
be tracked can be as exact as an individual room in a building or home.162
The precision of this tracking reveals some of the most sensitive information imaginable about an individual, information that law enforcement
would otherwise be unable to obtain based on the traditional restraints on
abusive police practices “limited police resources and community hostility.”163 For example, information about activities such as, “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center,
the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the un156.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
157.
See Mark J. Kwasowski, Note and Comment, Thermal Imaging Technology:
Should Its Warrantless Use By Police be Allowed in Residential Searches?, 3 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 393, 398 (1997) (citing United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1503
(10th Cir. 1995); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989)).
158.
See id. (citing Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-50; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-13).
159.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
160.
See New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013).
161.
Rainie, supra note 5.
162.
Hearing, supra note 11, at 15-16.
163.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ion meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”
are all revealed to law enforcement without first having to establish probable cause to a neutral magistrate.164 It is hard to believe that these sensitive
types of activities (which are often engaged in privately) would not be recognized as reasonable by society and the Court in light of other expectations of privacy the Court has found to be reasonable.165 If Katz’s phone
booth conversation about illegal gambling was protected under a reasonable
expectation of privacy a logical inference is that an individual’s location
that reveals a likely communication with a healthcare provider, attorney,
cleric, bartender, and so on would enjoy the same privacy protections.166
Under Katz it is clear that law enforcement could not place a listening
device in an examining room in a doctor’s office, where the doctor specializes in certain illness, for example, to eavesdrop on the conversation between a suspect and his doctor without first obtaining a warrant.167 Yet,
location data gathered pursuant to the SCA without a warrant would reveal
essentially the same information. While the location data would not reveal
the exact conversation between this hypothetical patient and doctor, if the
doctor specialized in the treatment of a certain ailment it takes very few
inferential leaps to determine what the two were talking about. While this is
only one hypothetical where location data reveals more than just the location of law enforcement’s target it is not hard to imagine many other similar
situations where reasonable expectations of privacy are intruded upon by
location data gathering. This Comment is in no way suggesting that the
ability of law enforcement to conduct visual surveillance on suspects should
be altered as visual surveillance of the hypothetical doctor visit would likely pass Fourth Amendment muster according to Katz and Knotts.168 The use
of location data exposes a much broader picture of an individual’s life than
traditional surveillance due to its seemingly limitless reach without the
safeguards imposed by limited agency resources.169 While it would be foolish to celebrate the detriment imposed on law enforcement’s ability to fight
crime due to limited resources it would be equally unwise to embrace the
limitless use of location data gathering without judicial oversight.170 To be
clear, this Comment is not advocating keeping relevant location data out of
164.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting New York v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone booth conversation).
166.
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Weaver, 909
N.E.2d at 1199).
167.
See Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
168.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
169.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
170.
See id.
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the hands of law enforcement because it is clearly an invaluable tool. Rather, this Comment is suggesting that law enforcement be required to obtain
a warrant based on probable cause before obtaining location data that interferes with reasonable expectations of privacy.
As discussed above, the court in United States v. Skinner determined
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
location data emitted from his cell phone.171 Oddly, as the concurring opinion of Judge Bernice B. Donald points out, the majority in Skinner seems to
base this finding of no reasonable expectation of privacy on the basis that
the defendant was engaged in illegal activity.172 The majority expresses this
by opining “[w]hen criminals use modern technological devices to carry out
criminal acts and to reduce the possibility of detection, they can hardly
complain when the police take advantage of the inherent characteristics of
those very devices to catch them.”173 Similarly, the majority found no constitutional violation “because Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the data given off by his voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go
cell phone. If a tool used to transport contraband gives off a signal that can
be tracked for location, certainly the police can track the signal.”174 Whether or not an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location data emitted from his mobile device should not turn on the criminality
of the conduct in which he has engaged. 175 To do so would give noncriminals a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data while
denying the same to those engaged in criminal activity. Under this type of
analysis, Katz’s phone call about illegal gambling certainly would not be
protected but that is not what the Supreme Court determined.176
The Skinner majority also determined that United States v. Knotts177
was the controlling precedent because like in Knotts, Skinner’s location
data from his cell phone revealed his location on public thoroughfares
where his location could have been monitored visually.178 Here, the Skinner
majority seems to rely on hind sight because as the facts played out in Skinner only location data the DEA agents obtained could have observed visually.179 This begs the question: what if the location data that was obtained
171.
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012).
172.
Id. at 784-85.
173.
Id. at 774.
174.
Id. at 777.
175.
Id. at 785 (citing United States v. Hicks, 59 F. App’x 703, 706 (6th Cir.
2003); United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Fields, 113
F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 n.10 (2d Cir.
1980)).
176.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
177.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
178.
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777-78.
179.
See id.
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without a warrant revealed Skinner’s location somewhere unobservable by
traditional visual surveillance, such as in the basement of his home? This
question highlights a large problem with law enforcement obtaining location data without a warrant. When police request location data, they have no
way of knowing up front if the data will reveal private or public location
information.180 As a result, a system of allowing law enforcement to only
access location data revealing information that could be viewed through
visual surveillance without a warrant would not be practicable.181 At least
where a warrant has been issued there is the safe guard of probable cause in
addition to police discretion before the target’s privacy is invaded.182
B.

LOCATION DATA NOT KNOWINGLY EXPOSED

Even if an individual has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
in something that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, therefore
passing both prongs of the Katz test, it may still fail to be protected under
the Fourth Amendment if the individual has knowingly exposed the subject
matter to the public.183 Specifically, the Court in Katz stated that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”184 So does a mobile device
owner knowingly expose anything to the public sufficient to render the location of their mobile device and as a byproduct their location unprotected
by the Fourth Amendment?
It is the position of this Comment that a mobile device owner has not.
Perhaps the strongest argument against this position is found by analogizing
location data to numbers that were recorded by a pen register installed on a
telephone in Smith v. Maryland.185 However, this analogy is a stretch. In
Smith, the Court determined that “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to
its equipment in the ordinary course of business” when he dialed phone
numbers on his telephone that would be used by the company to complete
his call.186 The Court reasoned that the defendant knew he was exposing
this information, which would be subsequently recorded by the company
because long distance calls were reflected on his billing statements.187

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J. 2013).
Id.; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
Id.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 742.

2015]

PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK WITH BIG BROTHER

451

Outside of when an individual purchases a mobile device, places a
phone call, sends a message or communicates in some other way via their
device like in Smith, it is questionable that the owner or user has knowingly
exposed anything else. To view otherwise is to assume that owners of mobile devices are well versed in the intricacies of wireless communication
and the procedures service providers engage in when connecting communications. The Fifth Circuit court in In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data
seems to have had high expectations for what mobile device owners are
aware of when it opined that mobile device users voluntarily convey their
cell-site data to law enforcement because they decide to “get a phone, to
select a particular service provider, and to make a call, and because he
knows that the call conveys cell site information, the provider retains this
information, and the provider will turn it over to the police if they have a
court order . . . .”188
The expectations adopted by the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in regards to what a mobile device owner knowingly exposes
to the public when using the device are more realistic. The Third Circuit
took a drastically different approach than that of the Fifth Circuit stating:
A cell phone customer has not “voluntarily” shared
his location information with a cellular provider in
any meaningful way. As the EFF notes, it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their
cell phone providers collect and store historical location information. Therefore, “[w]hen a cell
phone user makes a call, the only information that
is voluntarily and knowingly conveyed to the
phone company is the number that is dialed and
there is no indication to the user that making that
call will also locate the caller; when a cell phone
user receives a call, he hasn't voluntarily exposed
anything at all.”189
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey is of the opinion that
“[a]lthough individuals may be generally aware that their phones can be
tracked, most people do not realize the extent of modern tracking capabilities and reasonably do not expect law enforcement to convert their phones
into precise, possibly continuous tracking tools.”190 Because some mobile
188.
189.
Records to
Found.).
190.

In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013).
In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (2010) (citing amici brief of the Elec. Frontier
New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013).
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device owners are certainly more knowledgeable than others in regards to
what they are exposing to their service provider by using their mobile device, determining what a large group knows is likely impossible beyond
speculating into generalities. Regardless of what the average mobile device
user knows about what they are exposing by making a call or sending a
message, the reality of the matter is that law enforcement obtains location
data from mobile devices even where the owner or user takes no affirmative
step,191 such as dialing a call. As discussed in the background section of this
Comment, mobile devices’ location is recorded every seven seconds as long
as the device is turned on,192 GPS equipped mobile devices can be tracked
in real time,193 and mobile devices can be pinged without any action or
knowledge on the part of the user as was the case in United States v. Skinner in order to reveal their location.194 In theory, a mobile device user could
be tracked without ever using the device other than to turn on the power
button.195 To say that by simply possessing a mobile device that is turned
on, an individual has knowingly exposed their whereabouts to the public is
a big leap from the Supreme Court holding that an individual knowingly
exposes phone numbers they dial196 and should not be accepted. To accept
this leap gets away from the idea of an individual actually exposing something. When the defendant in Smith dialed numbers, all he conveyed to the
company was the numbers he dialed.197 He was not said to have conveyed a
mountain of other information as a byproduct. Imagine a Christmas tree on
display in a front room picture window. The tree’s owner has clearly knowingly exposed that Christmas tree to the public, yet it would be absurd to
say that by knowingly exposing the tree they have also knowingly exposed
everything else in the home to the public. Following the same reasoning, it
is illogical to say that by virtue of buying a product and perhaps not even
using it in any meaningful way that an individual has somehow knowingly
invited his service provider and accompanying law enforcement to chaperone his every move. It may sound elementary, but what a mobile device
user knowingly exposes to the public, and therefore loses Fourth Amendment protections, should be limited to what has actually been knowingly
exposed by the user to the service provider.198

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 637.
See id.
Id.
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012).
See Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
Id.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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LOCATION DATA REVEALS INTIMATE INFORMATION
ABOUT THE HOME

The Supreme Court has opined that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”199 Nonetheless, it is hard to ignore the special designation the Court has given to an individual’s home in connection with the
Fourth Amendment. The Court has stated “when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals.”200 The Court’s jurisprudence
has made it clear that an individual’s protections under the Fourth Amendment are at their height in the home.201
For example, in United States v. Karo the Court’s holding turned upon
the fact that the beeper entered the defendant’s home revealing information
to law enforcement that could not have otherwise been observed, which
amounted to a search.202 Further, the Court in Karo opined that as a general
rule, searches of a home should be done pursuant to a warrant.203 Similarly,
in Kyllo v. United States law enforcement’s use of thermal imaging equipment directed at a home was deemed an unreasonable search because all
details within the home are intimate and “the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes.”204
As discussed previously in this Comment, tracking of mobile devices,
whether done via network based tracking or GPS tracking, can locate a mobile device to within a matter of feet or an individual room.205 Homes are
not exempt from this tracking ability.206 Because mobile devices are only
useful to their owners if they are at hand, they are usually located in close
proximity to their owner. As a result, common sense dictates that mobile
devices spend a large amount of time within homes because their owners
do. Location data requests can seek data from months at a time, all but
guaranteeing the device’s location will be revealed within the owner’s
home at some point.207 When law enforcement obtains location data that
reveals a mobile device’s location within a home, there can be little doubt
that a search has occurred. This is a search because the location data has
revealed intimate information about the interior of the home (the location of
199.
Id.
200.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); see also Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
201.
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the mobile device and likely the owner’s location) that would otherwise
have been unknowable to law enforcement.208 To hold that law enforcement
is entitled to know where a suspect’s mobile device is without first obtaining a warrant would render the Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]n the
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire
area is held safe from prying government eyes”209 hollow and erode the
Court’s position that searches of the home are to be done pursuant to a warrant.210
D.

BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION IS OUTDATED

When the Fifth Circuit determined that warrantless gathering of location data by law enforcement to be constitutional in In Re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, the court based its ruling on the principle that location
data is a business record maintained by service providers in their course of
business.211 This principle is founded in Supreme Court precedent holding
that what an individual exposes to a third party, even if done confidentially,
is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections and may be acquired by
law enforcement absent a warrant.212 At first blush, this designation as
business records appears reasonable because a mobile device owner when
dialing a number can be said to have exposed the same thing as the defendant in Smith or by selecting as service provider may expose some information to the provider similar to that of the bank account holder in Miller.213
While this may seem reasonable at first blush, this precedent does not
fit with modern advancements in technology.214 It is important to note that
the criticisms voiced at the time the Supreme Court adopted the business
records doctrine still carry the same force today. For example, Justice Marshall doubted that individuals somehow give up all expectations of privacy
by handing over something for a limited business purpose when he wrote,
“Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited
business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes.”215 Justice William J. Brennan Jr. called
208.
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209.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
210.
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Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41
(1976)).
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Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (citing Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95-96
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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into question how voluntary exposures to certain businesses really are given
that many services have become nearly essential when he opined, “For all
practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their
financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”216
The arguments made by these dissenting Justices apply equally to the
issue of location data gathered from mobile devices. Following Justice
Marshall’s logic in Smith, it is reasonable that a mobile device owner (who
may likely not know that his service provider can track his device twentyfour hours a day) would not expect that information to be shared with anyone else for purposes other than business, including the police.217 This logic
has carried the majority of the Court in other cases where the Court held
that just because some information may have been exposed to a third party
for a limited purpose did not grant police the right to access that information without a warrant.218 The ability of landlords and hotel staff to access information that is kept private by their tenant or guest has not been
extended to law enforcement just because the landlord or staff has that access.219 If a landlord cannot reveal to police what his tenant keeps private, a
service provider should not be allowed to reveal intimate private information about a customer without first obtaining a warrant.220 To hold otherwise would reduce the Fourth Amendment privacy to the discretion of a
landlord or, in this case, a service provider.221
Just as Justice Brennan found having a bank account essential for participation in contemporaneous economic life, the same can be said of mobile devices today.222 It can be argued that for most Americans not having a
mobile device is not an option because they are often necessary to stay in
contact with work, finances, family, and to ensure safety as evidenced by
the fact that ninety-one percent of Americans own them.223 Interestingly, a
similar number of American families have bank accounts at ninety-two
percent, demonstrating that if a bank account can be considered essential so
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can a mobile device.224 To conclude that by simply owning a mobile device
its owner has given up all expectations of privacy about where they go
would be to hold privacy hostage at the expense of technology.225 Under
this perspective, mobile device purchasers are faced to choose between
privacy and having a device they may find necessary to conduct their modern life. This is not a choice individuals should have to make.226 Given the
vast amount of information which service providers are privy to, the proper
approach would be to keep information that has been exposed to them, only
exposed to them.227 Any other approach relegates an individual’s privacy
right to the level of record keeping a service provider chooses to engage in.
Nearly forty years ago, Justice Brennan recognized that new technological advancements posed a danger for individual privacy concerns and
the necessity of the law to adapt to those dangers writing, “Development of
photocopying machines, electronic computers and other sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of government to intrude into areas
which a person normally chooses to exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently judicial interpretations of the reach of the constitutional protection of individual privacy must keep pace . . . .”228 More recently, Justice Sotomayor has echoed this belief and gone as far as to say it
may be time to reconsider the idea that individuals do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in what is disclosed to third parties according to
Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller.229 Justice Sotomayor opined
that the third party approach is not well suited to the digital age where individuals reveal a great amount of information to service providers by just
going about everyday tasks.230 Technology has certainly changed a great
deal since the 1970s when Miller and Smith were decided. Rules that were
promulgated in the age of pay phones, paper checks, and eight track tapes
may need to be adjusted to suit technology that is approaching that appearing on the Jetsons.231 If this chain of precedent does not change, individual
privacy may become a piece of antiquated American tradition.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Law enforcement is currently engaging in a practice of retrieving both
historical and real time location data from service providers without first
obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause.232 It is not the position
of this Comment that law enforcement should be kept from this location
data altogether because this data is an invaluable resource in their battle
against crime. This Comment is simply of the belief that law enforcement
should first obtain a warrant based on probable cause before obtaining location data to ensure that individual’s privacy interests are not violated.
The United States’ Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the topic, but
several appellate level courts have recently addressed the constitutionality
of law enforcement retrieving location data without a warrant and have
reached different conclusions. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have upheld the
warrantless searches as constitutional but reached this conclusion on slightly different grounds.233 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in applying New
Jersey law, found that law enforcement obtaining location data absent a
warrant to be unconstitutional but, in doing so, they engaged in much of the
same analysis as the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.234
The constitutionality of a warrantless search is largely determined by
applying the two prong test first laid out by Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States and in the subsequent line of cases applying that test.235 In applying the Katz test to law enforcement obtaining location data from service providers, it is the opinion of this Comment that the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits erred in upholding the practice without a warrant.
Mobile device users who do not wish to have their whereabouts known by
the world or law enforcement should be viewed to have exhibited an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.236 Further, mobile device users should not be viewed to have knowingly exposed
their location to the public, therefore losing Fourth Amendment protections
of that information.237 Additionally, location data obtained without a warrant can reveal intimate information about the interior of one’s home that
could not be otherwise observed by law enforcement.238 The Supreme Court
has determined that such intimate information about the interior of a home
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should only be obtained by law enforcement pursuant to a warrant.239 This
precedent should not be deviated from in regards to location data. Finally,
Supreme Court precedent holding that information conveyed to a third party—even if confidential and done so for business purposes—is not protected under the Fourth Amendment and should be reconsidered as it is out of
touch with the realities of modern society, where ninety-one percent of
Americans own a mobile device.240 If this precedent is not reconsidered,
millions of Americans may be said to have no expectation of privacy in
their location, simply due to the fact that they purchased a mobile device to
keep up with the times and the demands of modern life.241 Americans
should not have to forfeit their privacy as a result of buying a product many
likely consider to be essential.242
Law enforcement undoubtedly engages in warrantless location data
gathering with the best of intentions: the intentions of fighting crime, ensuring national security, and curbing the trade of illegal narcotics. But good
intentions do not alleviate the potential for abuse that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect against. The words of Daniel Webster—a famous
American diplomat, senator, and lawyer from well over a century ago—ring
equally true today when he said:
Good intentions will always be pleaded for every
assumption of power ; but they cannot justify it,
even if we were sure that they existed. It is hardly
too strong to say that the Constitution was made to
guard the people against the dangers of good intention, real or pretended. . . . There are men in all ages who mean to exercise power usefully ; but who
mean to exercise it. They mean to govern well ; but
they mean to govern. They promise to be kind masters ; but they mean to be masters.243
For now, the only way to be sure your mobile device is not serving as
a de facto monitoring device that law enforcement can access without a
warrant is to have the device turned off.244 Before you turn that device back
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on, be careful where you go because big brother may be looking no matter
how hard you try to hide.245

245.

Id.

